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This paper aims to draw attention to the social and
micropolitical dimensions of attempting to implement
improvements within healthcare organisations. It is
argued that quality improvement initiatives, like other
forms of organisational innovation, will fail unless
they are conceived and implemented in such a way
as to take into account the pattern of interests, values
and power relationships that surround them. Drawing
on examples, it is suggested that innovators can
intervene more successfully if they understand how
the beneﬁts and costs of interventions are likely to
be distributed among stakeholders within their setting,
how different but equally legitimate value sets may
structure peoples’ understanding of them and
how the nature of the interventions themselves (and,
in particular, the shape of their hard core and soft
periphery) might provide scope for redesigning
or adapting interventions in ways that are likely
to make them both more effective and politically
feasible.
This paper argues that however rational and
reasonable they may appear on paper, quality
improvement initiatives, like other forms of
organisational innovation, will fail unless they
are designed and implemented in such a way
as to take into account the pattern of inter-
ests, values and power relationships that
surround them. Would-be innovators thus
need to look beyond evidence in order to
make desirable initiatives more ‘powerful’ or
inﬂuential. In other words, champions of
innovation and rational process improvement
needdperhaps paradoxicallydto become
more political.
Several authors have attempted to under-
stand the success of quality improvement
initiatives by studying organisations that have
been more or less successful at implementing
them. For example, Ferlie and Shortell
emphasise four groups of success factors
for quality improvement: leadership at all
levels, a culture supportive of learning
and change, teamwork and appropriate
information systems.
1 Other researchers have
added structural, political and strategic
factors.
23Similarly, Sexton, Pronovost and
colleagues point to the importance of clinical
culture in successfully implementing patient
safetyinitiatives.
45Theseideasallmakesense,
and organisations clearly need to invest in
these areas to improve their performance.
However, knowledge of these general
factors unfortunately does not tell us much
about how and why any speciﬁc evidence-
based innovation or improvement initiative
does or does not receive support in a speciﬁc
context. This is an important practical
question. As we know from extensive
research, formal evidence concerning the
superiority of any practice is insufﬁcient in
itself to ensure its implementation.
6 7 In his
treatise on how to ‘make social science
matter,’ Bent Flyvbjerg notes that knowledge
of power relations in any given context is
necessary to understand what is taken to be
rational and right, and moreover that ratio-
nality (eg, research ‘evidence’) can prevail
only if it takes power into account.
89In this
paper, we elaborate on this idea and
consider its practical implications for those
w h ow i s ht om o v eq u a l i t yi m p r o v e m e n t
initiatives into practice.
Speciﬁcally, we introduce and illustrate
here three key observations based on our
previous research on the diffusion and
adoption processes of complex healthcare
innovations that involve both clinical and
management stakeholders.
10 Many quality
improvement initiatives are of this type. We
also relate these observations to research
by other scholars who have looked at change
in healthcare practice from a managerial
perspective.
237For each observation, we
ﬁrst present the central point, then provide
an example from our research and
ﬁnally, explore its practical implications.
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The social determinants of actionOBSERVATION 1: THE DISTRIBUTED NATURE OF COSTS
AND BENEFITS
The ﬁrst observation is that complex interventions
aimed at implementing new healthcare technologies or
at improving quality tend to have distributed costs and
beneﬁts. In other words, while an innovation might
theoretically have potential beneﬁts for patients, the
consequences may not be uniformly positive for all the
other people involved in its implementation.
One of the cases we looked at in our research involved
the use of low-molecular-weight heparin (LMWH) to
treat deep vein thrombosis.
10 At the time of the study,
there was plenty of scientiﬁc evidence that the procedure
was safe and valuable for patients.
11 However, this inno-
vation had different implications for different stake-
holders. For hospital administrators, it was a way to save
beds because the treatment allowed early discharge and
follow-up in the community. For some doctors, it was
seen as ‘best practice’ and a way to increase throughput
(and possibly income), while for others, it raised concern
that patients might not be adequately followed up (as
well as leading to reduced income). For nurses, it meant
more time spent on teaching to enable patients to inject
themselves. For community clinics, it involved increased
responsibilities that were not necessarily covered by
increased budgets. For patients, it could be a way to
avoid hospitalisation, or perhaps an increased cost and
inconvenience. Negotiating across interprofessional and
interorganisational lines further made convergence
complicated, although the diverse beneﬁts for a variety
of actors provided multiple entry points in the push to
build a coalition in favour of adoption.
The point is that the distributed nature of the beneﬁts
and costs of any practice needs to be understood if one
wants to implement change. Although some quality
improvement proponents might feel uncomfortable
stepping outside the role of rational expert, knowing
‘what’s in it for whom’ is helpful in seeing how and why
some new practices might meet with resistance, while
others are adopted very easily. (Sometimes, innovations
may even be adopted too easily. A corollary of the
argument above is that when a new practice immediately
seems to be in everyone’s interest, there can be a rush to
adopt it, sometimes before clear evidence is available, as
may have happened, for example, during the early years
of laparoscopic surgery.
10) A useful tool for assessing the
weight of support and likely lines of resistance for a given
intervention project is ‘stakeholder mapping.’
12 This
involves placing key stakeholders on a two-by-two grid
showing (a) their power to inﬂuence adoption and (b)
their interest in doing so. For example, elements that
might be used to position stakeholders according to
their relative power might include assessments of formal
authority, control of resources (expertise, budgets,
prestige) and connections to powerful others (eg, senior
management, media, etc). To assess interests, one can
examine the likely costs and beneﬁts of the focal project
for that stakeholder. Such an analysis can be helpful
in understanding whether, when and why the project
is likely to receive support, and in thinking about strat-
egies for coalition-building, a crucial step in achieving
organisational change.
13 14
OBSERVATION 2: THE VARIETY OF VALUE SYSTEMS
UNDERLYING INTERVENTIONS
Our second observation is that the people involved in
implementing quality improvements hold different
values about what is appropriate that may underpin
particular interests. While interests revolve around
personal beneﬁts (what is in this for me personally?),
values concern what is right and good. People naturally
tend to justify their positions in terms of such legitimate
concerns. Indeed, different professional groups and
providers tend to see the world in different ways in
correspondence with their training and experience.
7 For
example, while evidence represented by randomised
control trials may be the gold standard in determining
appropriate care for an academic health centre physi-
cian, issues such as equity, cost and patient choice may
quite legitimately underlie the positions of other stake-
holders such as administrators and community groups.
Sometimes these different value sets appear incom-
mensurable, and explain why agreement is so difﬁcult
despite apparently incontrovertible evidence.
For example, one of the innovations examined in our
study was ‘assertive community treatment’ (ACT) for
psychiatric patients with severe psychotic disorders. ACT
is a highly normalised intervention package involving
multidisciplinary teams who take an active, even aggres-
sive, part in supporting patients in the community. It has
been extensively studied in randomised control trials
and found to be effective on a long list of criteria such as
quality of life, medication compliance, patient satisfac-
tion and cost.
15 However, we found strong ideologically
based differences of opinion about it between those who
favoured ‘medical’ or ‘social’ approaches to mental
health, placing in stark contrast the ‘scientiﬁc’ model of
traditional medicine and the ‘social’ model of commu-
nity activists where patient freedom and the avoidance of
control were preferred.
16 This issue raised more passions
on both sides than any other innovation we studied.
10
Clearly, there was much more to this than a question of
scientiﬁc evidence. And clearly, scientiﬁc evidence is not
value-free.
To different degrees, value differences may underlie
many potentialimprovement interventions. Forexample,
i44 BMJ Qual Saf 2011;20(Suppl 1):i43ei46. doi:10.1136/bmjqs.2010.046482
The social determinants of actionFerlie and colleagues described how differences in how
nurses and doctors viewed evidence intervened in deter-
mining the spread of innovations.
7 The very notion of
‘quality’ can raise ﬁerce ideological debates between
those who see it purely in terms of clinical excellence and
those who see it more broadly in terms of providere
patient relationships. For example, Barker urges a return
to the values of individualised caring associated tradi-
tionally with the nursing profession that he sees as being
underminedbytheemphasis onimpersonalstandardised
protocols associated with evidence-based practice.
17
The important thing to understand here is that when
profound value differences underlie conﬂict about
initiatives, calling on ‘evidence’ in a dogmatic way may
simply talk past the key ethical dilemmas involved rather
than addressing or confronting them. As media richness
theory suggests, dealing with disagreements about goals
and values requires richer information exchange
involving face-to-face discussions to ﬁnd room for
mutual understanding.
18 19
OBSERVATION 3: THE HARD CORE AND THE SOFT
PERIPHERY
The third observation is that innovations or quality
improvement initiatives are not as simple, clear and
bounded as some of the evidence used to support them
might imply. Rather, innovations tend to have a hard
core and a soft periphery.
10 The hard core is the element
that is irreducible and that carries the key potential
beneﬁt (eg, the use of a drug). However, this is
surrounded by a gamut of complementary arrangements
involved in delivering the beneﬁt that may take a variety
of different forms. If the soft part of the intervention is
poorly organised, it may destroy the beneﬁt of the hard
core. On the other hand, the soft periphery also offers
considerable scope for organising the delivery of an
innovation in a way that will ensure support from
a range of stakeholders by potentially improving the
costebeneﬁt equation for them.
For example, in the LMWH case described above, it is
clearly the delivery of the drug that provides the beneﬁt
(the hard core). However, in order for this to occur,
a variety of arrangements for injection and follow-up had
to be designed (the soft periphery). There were multiple
ways of doing this that made little difference to the
clinical outcomes, but that could make a considerable
difference to the distribution of beneﬁts and costs to
other stakeholders. Another of the practices we looked
at involved the adoption of reusable haemodialysis ﬁlters
(to be reused on the same patient). This is a practice
that did not necessarily have strong clinical beneﬁts, but
it had been proven to be safe and offered ﬁnancial
beneﬁts. We found in our study that the organisations
that succeeded in implementing this practice were those
that agreed to share the overall ﬁnancial beneﬁts with
the nephrologistsdfor example, by enabling them to
increase the number of dialysis machines in operation.
10
The ‘soft periphery’ in this case basically concerned how
the economic beneﬁts were distributed.
The lesson here is that in attempting to implement
innovations, it is important to distinguish between what
is important and what is not. The soft periphery can be
an ally for those who wish to intervene to improve care
by providing scope for negotiation. Nevertheless, it is
also true that for some innovations, distinguishing
between the hard core and the soft periphery can be
difﬁcult. For example, the ACT intervention mentioned
above involves a complex package of measures. Yet, the
role of each component of the package in producing the
proven RCT outcomes is not entirely clear. While some
people argued that the only way to ensure reliable effects
is to implement the entire package, others selected those
elements that appeared most critical and feasible.
10 The
limits of ‘evidence,’ even RCT evidence, are evident
here! Without a degree of common sense, and yes,
political savvy, about what might realistically make things
better, it may be that nothing will be achieved at all.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This paper has attempted to reach beyond the discussion
of generalised success factors to think both more theo-
retically and more concretely about what is going on
when innovation or improvement initiatives are being
considered. We argued that would-be innovators would
beneﬁt from understanding how the beneﬁts and costs
of interventions are likely to be distributed among
stakeholders with different degrees of inﬂuence, how
different but equally legitimate value sets may structure
people’s understandings of them, and how the nature of
the interventions themselves (the shape of their hard
core and soft periphery) might provide scope for rede-
signing interventions in ways that are likely to make
them both effective and feasible.
Underlying these arguments is an understanding of
organisations as political systems. Power in healthcare
organisations is known to be diffuse as compared with
most businesses because of the importance of profes-
sional expertise. Elsewhere, we have referred to these
organisations as ‘pluralistic settings.’
20 Making quality
interventions work and stick in such settings requires
network building and persistence. Scientiﬁc evidence
can certainly contributedmany managers and profes-
sionals value it. But for all the reasons indicated above, it
is insufﬁcient on its own. A conception of healthcare
organisations as political systems suggests that those who
wish to improve them need, as Flyvbjerg indicates,
9 to
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The social determinants of actionlearn to understand how they workdnot ‘in general’ but
speciﬁcally, to think carefully about the nature of the
interventions they are planning to implement and ﬁnd
pathways towards improvement that take the micro-
politics surrounding them into account. However, before
everyone rushes off to read Machiavelli, such a perspec-
tive also brings us to two complementary observations
that warrant comment and reﬂection.
The ﬁrst is a warning. Unfortunately, there is some
truth to the idea that healthcare organisations some-
times seem to diffuse power among almost everyone,
except the people for whom they existdthe patients
needing care, especially the most vulnerable and least
protected by advocacy from family and friends. There is
thus a danger in an overly ‘pragmatic’ political
perspective if it means that their voices are not heard.
For this reason, bringing patients into the process needs
to be encouraged. Concepts such as ‘patient-centred
care’ or ‘patient empowerment’ are intended to achieve
this. Madison provides an insightful review of the ways in
which patients may come to have inﬂuence within
healthcare systems as well as the advantages, risks and
political implications of such participation.
21
Our ﬁnal point brings us back to the observation that
organisations that have been successful in consistently
implementing improvement initiatives have certain
characteristics: for example, they exhibit leadership at all
levels, and have cultures supportive of learning and
innovation, teamwork and strong information systems.
1
In fact, these are all features of organisational contexts
that structure political dynamics in ways that make
quality issues more salient. For example, information
systems that create accountabilities change the distribu-
tion of costs and beneﬁts of innovation for individual
stakeholders, supportive cultures change the values that
are seen as legitimate, while teamwork ensures greater
socialisation to these common values. Leadership
implies the existence of people who are capable of
navigating the system to get things done. The ‘evidence’
for factors such as these is overwhelming.
23
And yet, evidence is not everything, as we have been
saying all along. Those who wish to intervene to create
the overall conditions described as generative of
continuous quality improvement need to understand
that intervening to create those conditions is also
a political process. It too (and every laborious step on its
way) is affected by the distribution of costs and beneﬁts
of any changes among stakeholders, by the mixture of
value systems in play and by the interpretation of what is
central and peripheral in the intervention itself, all this
in contexts where power is diffuse, and the capacity to
unilaterally impose direction is limited. Creating the
conditions for continuous quality improvement is
a micropolitical process all the way down.
All this suggests that knowledge about the processes
of intervention and of organisational change is as
important or more important to the improvement of
practices and of organisations as knowledge about which
interventions and organisations are most effective.
Practitioners need to be sensitive to accumulating
process-based knowledge, and scholars need to invest
further in developing it.
7 10 20 22 23
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